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Peripersonal/extrapersonal spaceIn three experiments, we investigated the influence of two types of language on memory for object loca-
tion: demonstratives (this, that) and possessives (my, your). Participants first read instructions containing
demonstratives/possessives to place objects at different locations, and then had to recall those object
locations (following object removal). Experiments 1 and 2 tested contrasting predictions of two possible
accounts of language on object location memory: the Expectation Model (Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton,
2014) and the congruence account (Bonfiglioli, Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rositani, & Vescovi, 2009). In
Experiment 3, the role of attention allocation as a possible mechanism was investigated. Results across
all three experiments show striking effects of language on object location memory, with the pattern of
data supporting the Expectation Model. In this model, the expected location cued by language and the
actual location are concatenated leading to (mis)memory for object location, consistent with models of
predictive coding (Bar, 2009; Friston, 2003).
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The relationship between language and non-linguistic repre-
sentations is a fundamental topic in the cognitive sciences. Often
this relationship is approached from the standpoint of the extent
to which non-linguistic representations are necessary for language
comprehension (e.g. within the framework of ‘embodied’ cogni-
tion; cf. Barsalou, 1999). However, equally important is the extent
to which language can influence non-linguistic processes
(Coventry, Christophel, Fehr, Valdés-Conroy, & Herrmann, 2013).
Language can direct the attention of a conspecific to the spatial
world; spatial expressions, such as these coins or the cup is on the
table serve to direct the attention of a hearer to regions of space
(Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). And the pairing of language with
visual events and images also affects what is recalled about the
spatial world. For example, Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) found
that children performed better in a mapping task when spatial
relations were paired with spatial language at encoding (e.g.,
‘‘I’m putting the book on the shelf”). They argue that relational lan-
guage fosters the development of representational structures that
facilitate cognitive processing (see also Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke,
& Katsnelson, 1999).Language can facilitate the binding and maintenance of color-
location conjunctions (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008, 2013; Farran &
O’Leary, 2015). For example, in a memory experiment, four-year
olds performed a task in which a target (e.g. a square split in half
by two different colors) was presented which they then had to find
in an array. Performance was enhanced if the target was accompa-
nied by spatial cues (e.g., ‘‘yellow is on top”). There was no addi-
tional benefit for children verbalizing the linguistic cue
themselves over just hearing the cue, as long as they had a stable
understanding of the spatial terms (Farran & O’Leary, 2015).
As well as facilitating memory, language presented with a spa-
tial scene can also lead to memory errors (Feist & Gentner, 2007;
Gentner & Loftus, 1979). For instance, Feist and Gentner (2007)
showed that recognition memory for spatial scenes was shifted
in the direction of the spatial relational language (spatial preposi-
tions) presented with scenes at encoding. In their study, partici-
pants saw with ambiguous pictures depicting spatial relations
accompanied with or without spatial sentences. When participants
responded in a later yes-no recognition task, spatial language at
encoding was associated with more false positives (in cases where
the spatial language at encoding was associated with a more pro-
totypical version of the spatial relation than the relation actually
shown). Feist and Gentner (2007) suggest this is a result of an
interactive encoding of language and visual memory, in which lan-
guage influences the way people encode visual scenes. More
broadly, language can be used as a tool in a task to aid memory
and/or processing of spatial information (see for example Frank,
Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman, &
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called ‘linguistic relativity’ (see Wolff & Holmes, 2011 for review).
The effects of language on memory are not limited to spatial
cognition. It has also been found that presenting possessive pro-
nouns in combination with a memory task enhances response
times and memory for objects (Shi, Zhou, Han, & Liu, 2011). Shi
et al. presented Chinese nouns preceded by a pronoun (my/his).
Participants had to scale the presented nouns for likeability and
were given a surprise memory test. In the my condition, partici-
pants responded faster and showed a better memory performance
for the nouns than in the his condition.
Although it has been shown that language can influence mem-
ory, it has yet to be demonstrated how it does so. In this paper, our
focus is on the (possible) influence of spatial demonstratives and
possessives on memory for object location. The continuous nature
of object location memory errors affords testing directly between a
number of possible mechanisms regarding how language affects
memory for object location.
Spatial demonstratives (e.g., this/that) are among the earliest
words children learn (Diessel, 2006) and have been shown to be
associated with discrete zones of peri-personal (near) and extra-
personal (far) perceptual space (Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, &
Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2006; Maes & de Rooij, 2007;
Stevens & Zhang, 2013; cf. Peeters, Hagoort, & Ozyürek, 2014).
However, this distinction is flexible and graded. Near space can
be extended or contracted by tool or weight use (Longo &
Lourenco, 2006), and the use of this is similarly extended when
participants use a stick to point at objects (Coventry et al., 2008).
In addition to distance, demonstrative choice is also affected by
other variables. Coventry, Griffiths, and Hamilton (2014) explored
the relationship between object knowledge and distance on both
demonstrative choice in English and memory for object location.
Across seven experiments they found that object familiarity (i.e.,
familiar versus unfamiliar colored shapes), object ownership
(whether the participant owned the object or not) and object visi-
bility (whether the object was covered with an opaque cover or
not) all affected demonstrative choice to describe object location
and (non-linguistic) memory for object location. For example,
unfamiliar objects (low frequency color-shape combinations, such
as a viridian nonagon) were misremembered as being further away
than they actually were relative to familiar objects (e.g., a red
square). In order to account for both the demonstrative choice data
and the memory data, Coventry et al. (2014) proposed a model of
the influence of object knowledge on both measures. In their
Expectation Model, memory for object location is a combination of
where an object is located and where an object is expected to be
located (see Fig. 1a). The expectation of the objects’ location is
combined with the actual object location (with an associated esti-
mation error) in memory, as follows:
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Fig. 1. Predictions from the different models, from left to right: a. Expectation Model,
between the actual location and the remembered location is presented, a higher value o
was. In a and b, the six distances from the participant (in cm) used in Experiment 1 and
participants in Experiment 3. The lines represent the influence of demonstratives (this/tha
more attention than ‘that’.where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, exp =
expected and err = estimation error.
Coventry et al. (2014) acknowledge that the model may operate
at encoding of object location or at retrieval. If the former is the
case, it is assumed that an object expected to be in peripersonal
space (such as an object owned by the participant), activates
peripersonal space as the participant encodes object location, and
therefore that the actual representation of location at encoding,
and later memory is a concatenation of expectation of where an
object is most likely to be located and where it is actually located.
The alternative possibility is that the location errors emerge only at
retrieval, consistent with effects found in the verbal overshadow-
ing (Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and
eye-witness testimony literatures (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978;
Loftus & Palmer, 1974; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985).
Coventry et al. (2014) did not examine the influence of language
on memory for object location, but by extension, the expectation
model makes predictions regarding how language might impact
upon memory for location. As this is associated with near space
and that with far space, one can assume that the expected distance
value associated with that would be greater than the expected
value distance associated with this. Combined with the actual dis-
tance, the expectation model therefore predicts a main effect of
language on memory for object location, with that associated with
(mis)memory for objects further away than they actually were
compared to this (Fig. 1a). Consistent with earlier studies, an effect
of location, in which memory for objects further away is worse
than for objects closer by, would be expected.
In contrast to the expectation model, there is a considerable
body of work within an ‘embodied cognition’ framework providing
evidence for the importance of congruence/incongruence effects
between language and space that makes different predictions from
the expectation model. A growing number of studies suggests that
participants’ performance is affected by congruence/incongruence
between language or concepts and space. For example, it has been
shown that participants respond more quickly to positively
valenced stimuli in a congruent high location than an incongruent
low location, and vice versa for negative stimuli (e.g., Barsalou,
2008; Meier & Robinson, 2004; cf. Lynott & Coventry, 2014). What
one might term a ‘congruence account’ has been extended to
movement planning, whereby movements are prepared based on
given language (Bonfiglioli, Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rositani, &
Vescovi, 2009; see also Stevens & Zhang, 2013). For example,
Bonfiglioli et al. (2009) required participants to grip an object after
listening to an instruction that indicated whether the object was
near or far. A significant interaction was found in which perfor-
mance was better when the descriptive language and space were
congruent compared to incongruent situations - reaction times
were significantly longer when language was incongruent with
space compared to when language and space were congruent.
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b. Congruence Model, c. Attention Allocation model. On the y-axis the difference
n the y-axis means an object is remembered as being further away than it actually
2 are plotted. In c, the x-axis represents the total possible fixation time (10 s) for
t). In c more attention leads to a smaller memory error, and ‘this’ is predicted to elicit
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ment planning. In line with the Theory of Event-Coding (TEC)
(Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), we extend these
findings in the action literature to memory. In the TEC, it is sug-
gested that perception and action share an indistinguishable
underlying representational medium. This would entail that, for
example, memory and action are based on the same cognitive
codes. Therefore, if an effect of interference due to incongruence
is found in action planning, it should be found in memory
(Hommel et al., 2001). When we extend the effects of congruence
on action to memory for object location, we would therefore pre-
dict a similar interaction. Congruence in language and space would
be expected to enhance the accuracy of memory for location, with
greater errors (without specification of direction) when there is a
mismatch between the demonstrative and location, as follows:
MD ¼ fðDa;C;DerrÞ
whereM = signedmemory error, D = distance, a = actual, C = congru-
ence of language with location and err = estimation error (Fig. 1b).
This means that when a congruent demonstrative is used to describe
an object’s location (e.g., this for an object close by, or that for an
object further away), memory for object location is expected to be
more accurate than when language and situation are incongruent
(e.g., that for an object close by, this for an object further away).
Distinct from both the Expectation and Congruence models, the
possible effect of language on memory should also be considered in
relation to the allocation of attention. A large literature shows that
language affects where one looks in a visual scene, for example in
terms of fixating particular objects when they are mentioned (e.g.,
Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). Building on this earlier work,
it is possible that language also affects the amount of time one
spends looking at an object. Given that this is associated with prox-
imity to a speaker, one might speculate that participants might
look longer at an object at a location when preceded with this com-
pared with that, as visual attention is allocated preferentially to
near objects compared to objects further away (Garrido-Vásquez
& Schubö, 2014). Following evidence that longer looking times
are associated with better memory performance (e.g., Huebner &
Gegenfurtner, 2010), one might then predict better accuracy of
recall for trials preceded with this compared with that. In Experi-
ment 3, we used eye tracking during the encoding phase, to inves-
tigate whether differences are driven by attention allocation
(Fig. 1c). In summary, the goal of the present studies was to test
whether language affects memory for object location, and to eluci-
date the mechanism involved. Specifically, we aimed to tease apart
these three accounts by examining the effects of demonstrative
and possessives on memory for object location. The first experi-
ment tested whether spatial demonstratives affected memory for
object location with contrasting predictions from two possible
models of how language affects memory: congruence vs. expecta-
tion. Experiment 2 tests whether the effects found for demonstra-
tives also occur for possessives (my/your) – terms which have also
been associated with the peripersonal/extrapersonal space distinc-
tion. Experiment 3 tests predictions from the attention allocation
model using eye tracking.1 Sample size is based on Coventry et al. (2014).2. Experiment 1: The influence of demonstratives on spatial
memory
This experiment tested whether spatial demonstratives paired
with an object at encoding affected memory for object location,
with objects placed at varying distances in front of participants
on a table and then removed. The main goal was to test between
the expectation and congruence models. Critically, the expectationmodel predicts a main effect of demonstrative on object location
memory and the congruence account predicts an interaction
between demonstrative and distance.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-six native English speaking students1 were tested, receiv-
ing either course credit or payment for their participation.
Stereoacuity was measured using the Randot Stereotest (Stereo
Optical Inc. Chicago, USA). Two participants did not have a threshold
of at least 4000 (arcseconds) and therefore were excluded. Two addi-
tional participants were excluded because they had more than 10%
incorrect answers in the memory task. This left 32 participants, 9
males and 23 females, with an age range of 18–31 years old
(M = 20.78, SD = 3.14).
2.1.2. Materials
Six distinguishable, different colored shapes on plastic discs
(e.g. yellow triangle/blue heart), 6.5 cm in diameter, were placed
at six different locations. The locations were spaced equidistantly
along a midline from the participants’ edge of a large conference
table (L = 320 cm, W = 90 cm), starting at 25 cm from the partici-
pant up to 150 cm. The three dots that were closest to the partici-
pants were located within peripersonal space, while the remaining
three dots were within extra-personal space (confirmed for each
participant). The table was covered with a black cloth so that no
spatial cues were present.
2.1.3. Procedure and design
Participants were asked to sit as close to the table as was com-
fortable, to ensure that all participants were approximately the
same distance from the objects. Then, they played a ‘memory game’
as used previously by Coventry et al. (2014); participants were told
the experiment was testing memory for object location. On each
trial, the participant read out an instruction card indicating which
object had to be placed on which location. The instructions all had
the form: ‘‘Place DEMONSTRATIVE, OBJECT COLOR, OBJECT NAME,
on the COLOR dot” (e.g., ‘‘Place this red triangle on the blue dot”).
Following the instruction, participants closed their eyes while the
experimenter placed the object as instructed. The participant was
then given 10 s to view the object and to memorize the object loca-
tion before the object and the dots were removed and the experi-
menter went behind a curtain to present an indication stick. Next,
the participant verbally instructed the experimenter to match the
near edge of the indication stick to the remembered near edge of
the object location. Participantswere then required to verbally indi-
cate the demonstrative used on the instruction card to ensure they
had attended to the instructions (see Fig. 2).
There were two demonstratives (this/that) and a neutral deter-
miner (the), six locations, and six objects. Participants were pre-
sented with six practice trials, after which 54 experimental trials
were conducted (consisting of 3 trials of every term on every loca-
tion: 3  3  6). The indication stick was presented at a distance of
10 cm (counterbalanced to be further or nearer) from the actual
location. Within the first 10 trials, there were three filler trials in
which the indication stick was presented at a distance of 20 cm
from the object location, to prevent the initial placement of the
stick becoming a cue for the object location. Every trial in which
a participant could not remember the demonstrative was repeated
at the end of the experiment (if a participant couldn’t remember
>10% of the trials s/he was excluded). Also trials in which a
participants’ estimate of the object location was >25 cm from the
“Place that 
black cross 
on the 
yellow dot”
“Further”
Fig. 2. In the ‘‘memory game”, the participant reads out the instruction card, then memorizes the object location and finally instructs the experimenter to move the indication
stick so it is aligned with where the edge of the object was.
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Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 1, error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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repeating, the trial was eliminated. At the end of the experiment,
reaching distance was measured for each participant. Every partic-
ipant could reach only the first three dots. The ‘memory game’
cover meant that participants were not aware that we were
interested in the differences between demonstratives (confirmed
during debrief).
2.2. Results and discussion
The memory displacement data – that is, the difference
between the recalled distance and the actual distance between
the recalled distance and the actual distance measured in centime-
ters – are displayed in Fig. 1 (see also Table 1, supplementary data).
Note that a positive value indicates that an object was (mis)re-
membered as further away than it actually was. A 3  6 (demon-
strative  location) ANOVA was performed on the memory
displacements. The assumption of sphericity was violated in both
the location and the demonstrative  location analyses. We there-
fore used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for these analyses.
There was a main effect of demonstrative, F(2,62) = 6.68,
MSE = 10.04, p < 0.01, gp2 = 0.18, showing an effect of language
on memory for object location: follow up (LSD) tests showed sig-
nificant differences between locations accompanied by the that
(M = 2.94, SE = 0.42) compared to both the this (M = 2.01,
SE = 0.41) and the the (M = 1.84, SE = 0.47) conditions (both
p’s < 0.01; see Fig. 3). There was a marginal effect of location, F
(5,155) = 2.33, MSE = 25.49, p = 0.08, gp2 = 0.07, revealing that
memory for object location deteriorated with distance, consistent
with previous studies. Importantly, there was no interaction
between demonstrative and location, F(10,310) = 1.4, MSE = 9.13,
p = 0.21, gp2 = 0.04. The results therefore support the expectation
model rather than the congruence model; this leads to more accu-
rate object location memory than that, irrespective of the congru-
ence between the specific demonstrative and location. We next
considered whether the same pattern of results might emerge with
a different language manipulation involving possessives.
3. Experiment 2: The influence of possessives on spatial
memory
Some studies have shown that ownership improves memory for
objects (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Shi et al.,2011; Turk et al., 2015) and influences how people physically
interact with objects (Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011). For
example, Cunningham et al. (2008) had a participant and a confed-
erate sort cards with pictures of shopping items into their own bas-
ket or the other person’s basket. At the end of the trials participants
completed a surprise memory test for the objects depicted on the
cards. Participants had more accurate memories for self-owned
objects than objects owned by a conspecific.
In another study, specifically targeting memory for object loca-
tion, Coventry et al. (2014), found that object ownership affected
memory for object location (and demonstrative choice). Using
the memory game paradigm, participants were given a set of coins
in payment at the start of the experiment, and the coins placed at
different to-be-remembered locations were either those coins or
coins owned by the experimenter of the same denominations.
Participants misremembered the conspecific’s coins as being fur-
ther away than their own coins.
One of the problems with the ownership studies described
above is that they cannot easily distinguish between an effect of
the abstract concept of ownership and an effect of the possessives
(my/your) used to indicate ownership during task instruction. For
example, in the study of Coventry et al. (2014), coins were given
to participants as participant payment at the start of the task to
confer ownership, but language during the task itself involved by
necessity the use of possessives (e.g., ‘‘Place your coin on the red
dot”) in order to disambiguate which coin was to be placed during
the task. It is therefore unclear whether the effect of ownership is
driven by the language indicating ownership (possessives in all
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Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 2, error-bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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bination of the two. Here we investigated whether possessives
have the same influence on memory for object location as did
the demonstratives in Experiment 1, whether personal possessives
alone are able to drive memory effects, and again, whether the
expectation vs. congruence models offer a better account as to
how possessives affect memory for object location.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-nine native English speaking participants were tested, as
in Experiment 1. Five participants in total were excluded as they
did not score above the threshold of 4000 (N = 2), had more than
10% mistakes in the memory task (N = 2) or could not reach the
50 cm point (N = 1). This left 34 participants, 14 male and 20
female, with an age range of 18–44 years old (M = 23.76, SD = 4.87).
3.1.2. Procedure and design
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the exception
that the demonstratives were replaced with possessives (my, your;
the the condition was retained). To allow us to distinguish between
an actual ownership effect and a language effect of possessives,
participants did not own any of the objects, and all objects were
used in all language conditions.
3.2. Results and discussion
The memory displacement data are displayed in Fig. 4 (see
also Table 1, supplementary data). A 3  6 (possessive  location)
ANOVA was performed on the difference (in centimeters)
between the actual position of an object and the memorized posi-
tion. There was a main effect of possessive, F(2,66) = 8.25,
MSE = 7.62, p = 0.001, gp2 = 0.2, showing that objects in the your
condition (M = 1.89, SE = 0.43) were remembered as being signif-
icantly further away than objects in both the my condition
(M = 0.81, SE = 0.34) and the the condition (M = 1.11, SE = 0.34),
both p’s < 0.01; see Fig. 4). A significant effect of location was also
found, F(5,165) = 3.47, MSE = 18.07, p = 0.01, gp2 = 0.1, showing
that accuracy deteriorated as the objects were placed further
away. These results are compatible with earlier studies on owner-
ship. However, as all objects were used in all language conditions,
there was no actual sense of ownership over any of the objects;
the ownership was only marked by the use of possessives. This
shows that possessives on their own affect memory for object
location.
Additionally there was an interaction between possessive and
location, F(10,330) = 2.25, MSE = 10.37, p = 0.03, gp2 = 0.06. As
can be seen in Fig. 4, the interaction pattern is consistent with
the expectation model and is not consistent with the congruence
account: there is no cross-over between peripersonal and extraper-
sonal space as would be expected in the congruence account.
However, it is the case that the effect of distance does seem to vary
as a function of language. To further unpack this, we ran three one-
way ANOVAs to test location effects by term, revealing that there
was only a reliable peri-personal/extra-personal effect in the your
and the conditions (p < 0.05). This effect was absent in the my
condition (p > 0.05; see Fig. 4). This suggests that memory for
possessed objects maybe particularly enhanced, overriding any
effect of peripersonal versus extrapersonal space.
4. Experiment 3: The influence of attention on spatial memory
So far the results are consistent the expectation account.
However, it is important to also consider the possibility that theresults might be driven by the allocation of attention. Visual
attention is allocated preferentially to objects nearby, compared
to objects further away (Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014) and
longer fixation times lead to better memory performance
(Huebner & Gegenfurtner, 2010). Therefore, the predictions of
memory error in the Expectation Model and what we have coined
an ‘‘Attention Allocation Model” are similar, but differ in underly-
ing mechanism. The Expectation Model predicts that memory for
object location is a function of the language used to refer to the
object (and the expectation of location associated with that lan-
guage) combined with the actual object location. The Attention
Allocation model suggests that memory for object location is a
function of the fixation time and the object location. The results
of Experiment 1 could therefore be alternatively explained by the
Attention Allocation Model - differences are driven by different fix-
ation times, cued by this versus that, rather than differences in
expectation values. In this experiment, we used eye tracking to
measure participants’ looking time during encoding. That allowed
us to measure the time a participant is focused on the object in
each language condition to see whether attention might account
for the main effect of language reported above.
A second aim of Experiment 3 is to explore the connection
between demonstratives and reference frames. As peri-personal
space is the area within our grasp, this can be seen as an ‘action
space’ in which objects are mapped onto an egocentric reference
frame, compared to extra-personal space which may be mapped
onto an allocentric reference frame (ter Horst, van Lier, &
Steenbergen, 2011). If the language effect that was found in the
first two experiments is driven by the expectation raised by the
specific use of language, then this expectation may result in differ-
ent use of reference frames. We explored whether encoding object
location onto an egocentric reference frame resulted in more
searching behavior along the sagittal line, to encode distance from
the participant, compared to encoding onto an allocentric refer-
ence frame which could result in more searching behavior along
the coronal line (see Fig. 5). Results could help distinguish between
models that predict solely an influence of egocentric representa-
tions on spatial memory versus ‘two-system’ models that predict
a parallel egocentric and allocentric representations in object loca-
tion memory (see Burgess, 2006).4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Nineteen participants were tested with the same method as in
Experiment 1. Three participants were excluded from the analysis
as the eye-tracker could not be calibrated. This left 16 suitable par-
ticipants for the analyses, 5 male and 11 female, with an age range
of 18–22 (M = 19.19, SD = 1.17).
Coronal
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Fig. 5. Coronal and Sagittal plane of searching. Fig. 6. Raw object sizes on the screen, during semantic gaze mapping.
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The procedure was based on Experiments 1 and 2, but in this
experiment, participants wore SMI eye-tracker glasses (30 Hz
binocular eye tracking glasses). For this reason, 4 positions were
used – two locations in peripersonal space and two in extraper-
sonal space (the first location was too close for the eye-tracker
and the furthest location was not useable because the area of inter-
est was too distorted). Before the experiment started, the glasses
were calibrated using marks on the wall. After that, calibration
was validated four times throughout the experiment by having
participants look at the four different locations on the table. The
eye-tracking data were coded using semantic gaze mapping.2 As
the angle from the participant to the object was different for every
location, the standard error in calibration of the eye-tracker image
was slightly different per location. These distortions had to be
accounted for in the semantic gaze mapping. Therefore, the coding
was slightly less stringent for further locations compared to closer
locations. For the furthest location, any fixation within an area of
6.5 cm (equivalent to the diameter of the object discs) around the
object was marked as a fixation on the object. In the nearest location,
any fixation within an area of 3.25 cm (half an objects’ diameter) was
marked as a fixation on the object (see Fig. 6).3 The gaze mapping
data were used in a 3  4 (demonstrative  location) design, investi-
gating the differences in total fixation time (ms) on the object.4.2. Results and discussion
The memory displacement data and the fixation times are dis-
played in Figs. 7 and 8 (see also Table 1, supplementary data).
The memory data were analyzed in a 3  4 (demonstrative  loca-
tion) ANOVA. A main effect of demonstrative was found, F(2,30)
= 5.77, MSE = 10.02, p < 0.01, gp2 = 0.28, in which recalled dis-
tances for object location in the that condition (M = 1.77,
SE = 0.68) were significantly further away than those in the this
condition (M = 0.07, SE = 0.79), p < 0.05. The this condition dis-
tances were also significantly closer than in the the condition
(M = 1.3, SE = 0.59), p < 0.05 (see Fig. 7). This replicates the result
of Experiment 1. There was also a main effect of location,
F(3,45) = 9.69, MSE = 29.77, p = 0.001, gp2 = 0.39, in which2 This involves the manual coding of video-based eye-tracking data, by which
fixations are coded on a gaze map.
3 Although the coding was adjusted for the different distances, this does not detract
from the results as the adjustments were conducted across the different language
conditions.participants’ accuracy deteriorated as locations were further away.
There was no interaction effect between demonstrative and
location, F(6,90) = 1.61, MSE = 9.26, p = 0.15, gp2 = 0.1, which
means that the effect of language was the same across locations.
To see whether the language effects found were driven by a
mechanism as hypothesized by the Expectation Model or the
Attention Attenuation Model, we next examined the gaze data col-
lected during encoding. A 3  4 (demonstrative  location) analy-
sis of object fixation time showed no effect of language, F(2,30)
= 0.13, MSE = 1974647.31, p = 0.81, gp2 = 0.009 (‘‘this”
M = 5175.70, SE = 345.44; ‘‘that” M = 5230.97, SE = 257.65; ‘‘the”
M = 5285.14, SE = 416.76), suggesting that the language effect is
not driven by differences in attention (see Fig. 8). There was a loca-
tion effect, F(3,45) = 4.66, MSE = 1997163.36, p < 0.01, gp2 = 0.24,
showing that participants fixated longer on locations further away.
However, this location effect could be due to the differences in cod-
ing caused by distance, as explained above. There was no interac-
tion effect between demonstrative  location, F(6,90) = 0.62,
MSE = 1442394.41, p = 0.71, gp2 = 0.04.
In a second analysis, we explored the connection between
demonstratives and reference frames, and specifically to test
whether people use different coordinate systems to remember
object locations, based on spatial language. Fixations were coded
as sagittal searching behavior, if a sequence of two or more fixa-
tions fell within a range on either side (left/right) of the white loca-
tion stick, the range being 3.25 cm from the sides for the closest
location and 6.5 cm from the furthest location. These distances
were based on the size of an object on the respective location as
represented on the screen (the actual objects had a diameter of
6.5 cm). Fixations were coded as searching behavior along the
coronal line if a sequence of two or more fixations fell within a
range above or below the object location. The range was half an
objects’ size for the closest location and one objects’ size for the
furthest location along the coronal plane. Fixations coded as fixa-
tions on the actual object were excluded from this analysis, so no
fixation was used twice. After this coding, a ratio of fixations was
calculated (coronal/(sagittal + coronal)) (see Fig. 7). A 3  4
(demonstrative  location) ANOVA was performed. There was no
main effect for demonstrative, F(2,30) = 0.15, MSE = 0.05, p = 0.86,
gp2 = 0.01; ‘‘this” M = 0.42, SE = 0.07; ‘‘that” M = 0.4, SE = 0.09;
‘‘the” M = 0.42, SE = 0.08, nor location, F(3,45) = 0.2.25, MSE = 0.16,
p = 0.13, gp2 = 0.13, nor an interaction with distance, F(6,90)
= 0.78, MSE = 0.05, p = 0.59, gp2 = 0.05, suggesting that the lan-
guage effect was not caused by differences in search-behavior.
Based on these data, we cannot distinguish between different
models for the use of reference frames in memory for object
location.
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Fig. 7. Behavioral data of Experiment 3, error-bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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are 95% confidence intervals.
H.B. Gudde et al. / Cognition 153 (2016) 99–107 1055. General discussion
The results of all three experiments show that language affects
memory for object location, with main effects of language in all
three studies. The use of both demonstratives (Experiment 1 and
3) and possessives (Experiment 2) affects memory for object loca-
tion. These results are consistent with previous studies showing an
influence of language on memory for spatial relations (Feist &
Gentner, 2007; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005), and also with the
effects of object knowledge on object location memory reported
by Coventry et al. (2014). We have found robust effects of language
on object location memory together with an effect of distance on
memory for object location. We first consider explanations for
these results prior to implications for theories of language and
memory more generally.
Three possible accounts of the influence of language on object
location memory were set out prior to designing the present series
of experiments: the expectation account, the congruence account,
and an attention allocation model. The difference between the
expectation and congruence models is the prediction of an interac-
tion in the latter, and a main effect of language without an interac-
tion in the former. The expectation model, proposed by Coventry
et al. (2014), to explain object knowledge effects on memory,
maintains that language elicits an expectation about an objects’
location which is concatenated with actual object location, leading
to the prediction that the language effect should be the same for
objects in near space and far space. In contrast, the congruence
account predicts that memory should be better for trials in which
language is congruent with the object location, predicting an inter-
action between language and location; congruent trials (where
this/that are respectively combined with near/far space) should
be remembered better than incongruent trials (in which this/thatare respectively combined with far/near space). In Experiments 1
and 3, there was no interaction, supporting the expectation
account. In Experiment 2 (possessives), there was an interaction,
but this effect was driven by the absence of a location effect for
the my condition and not by congruence/incongruence contrasts.
Thus, as a whole, results of the current experiments all support
the expectation model.
Experiment 3 tested the third possibility that different types of
language might result in different amounts of attention being paid
to objects/locations, with associated differences in memory perfor-
mance. Put simply, the longer one spends looking at an object, the
better one’s memory for object location. The eye tracking data from
this experiment revealed no differences in viewing time as a func-
tion of demonstrative. Also, participants did not present different
searching behavior based on different demonstratives, allowing
us to rule out the attention allocation model.
Given that the results support the expectation model, there are
three keys issues that merit discussion. First, we can consider the
relationship between the expectation model and memory models
more broadly. Memory for object location is often taken to involve
memory for the location in which an object is positioned, memory
for the object itself, and a binding between object location and
object (see for example Postma & De Haan, 1996). Previously,
Coventry et al. (2014), finding effects of object knowledge on mem-
ory for object location, argued against memory models that prior-
itize object location over object knowledge (e.g. the model of Jiang,
Olson, & Chun, 2000, who argued that location may act as an
anchor to which object properties are attached). However, the
effects of language on memory for object location and the previous
effects of object knowledge reported are consistent with variants of
object file theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984), in which object
location is one of the features integrated in the file. Location fea-
tures appear not to be bound to an absolute location but are
defined relative to an abstract representation, which leads to mem-
ory errors (see Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010; Pertzov, Dong,
Peich, & Husain, 2012). This focus on relative location can explain
how spatial language can cue memory for object location, via the
expectation of the objects’ location relative to the speaker or
another object. Wang and Spelke (2002) suggested that the human
representational system depends in some way on language, by
which humans can go beyond the limits of orientation systems
as found in animals. This influence of language skills may facilitate
more flexible problem solving (Hermer-Vazquez, Moffet, &
Munkholm, 2001). One can speculate that the advantage is that
such a relative, dynamic system enables us to mentally process
arrays in different contexts (e.g. a desk or the universe), using
the same language and concepts.
Second, one needs to unpack in more detail how the expecta-
tion model works, and in particular, how the expectation values
form and how they combine with the actual distance information
available. Coventry et al. (2014) do not offer detail regarding this,
but they assume that the expectation model works via the predic-
tion of object location as a product of the history and context of
past bindings between language, objects and location. For example,
objects owned by people are more likely to be near people than
equivalent objects owned by someone else. This likelihood is then
used to predict future encounters with objects: if an object is
owned, one would anticipate the object is nearer than if one does
not own the object. This anticipation works similarly for the visibil-
ity and familiarity parameters Coventry et al. (2014) identified.
Respectively, visible objects are usually closer than objects one
cannot see, and familiar objects are more likely to be near us than
unfamiliar objects. This anticipation-mechanism could be accom-
modated by correlational learning (see Pulvermüller, 2012) - the
process in which neurons that fire together strengthen their con-
nections and become more tightly associated (also known as
106 H.B. Gudde et al. / Cognition 153 (2016) 99–107potentiation), and such a mechanism has been implicated not only
in mapping language to perception (Coventry et al., 2013), but also
how one learns how words co-occur to form meaningful language
structures during language learning (Saffran, 2002; Saffran, Aslin, &
Newport, 1996).
The Expectation Model can also be extended outside spatial lan-
guage, both in cases where language is explicit during a task (as in
our studies), but also in cases where language may not be explicit,
but may nevertheless affect non-linguistic performance. For exam-
ple evidence from color perception (Bruner, Postman, & Rodrigues,
1951; Delk & Fillenbaum, 1965) has shown similar effects of the
influence of object knowledge on memory. Object knowledge influ-
ences categorization of objects, so that participants judge objects
within a category to have a more similar hue than objects between
categories. For example, in an array of letters and numbers, partic-
ipants judged symbols within a respective category to be more
similar in color than between categories, even if the two, between
categories, target symbols were identically colored (Goldstone,
1995). In another series of studies, it was shown that color memory
and color perception judgements are influenced by the character-
istic color of an object and these object knowledge effects were
stronger in objects with a high color diagnosticity (e.g. yellow for
a banana) than in objects with low color diagnosticity (yellow for
a lamp) (Belli, 1988; Bruner et al., 1951; Hansen, Olkkonen,
Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006; Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). These
‘top down’ effects on color perception are consistent with the idea
that knowledge of expected hue combines with actual hue infor-
mation leading to categorization errors. Such an account merits
further testing in this domain.
More broadly the Expectation Model is consistent with models
of predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005). Clark (2013) sug-
gests that people use prediction to minimize energy costs (the free-
energy principle, Friston, 2009). In this model, the brain receives
input from the perceptual system and uses existing knowledge to
predict or anticipate the new state of the world based on that per-
ceptual input (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2003). The brain prepares a
response based on this prediction and only needs to process the
error signal, the difference between the prediction and the updated
visual input, once the new state of the world emerges. This means
that instead of processing or ‘creating’ a full response, the brain
only needs to adjust the predicted response to be appropriate to
the actual input. In the Expectation Model, the prediction is based
upon learned associations between language, objects, and locations
(for example via statistical/correlational learning), these
associations can then reduce the work needed to process continu-
ally changing object location bindings on a moment to moment
basis.
A third issue that needs discussion is whether the effects of lan-
guage operate at the level of encoding or retrieval. One possibility
is that this, for example, actually activates peripersonal space more
when looking at an object than that, and therefore that the memory
differences are a direct result of differences in peripersonal space
activation during encoding. Such a view is consistent with recent
models of perception (e.g., Bar, 2009) that incorporate top-down
predictions from memory as a mechanism during the act of per-
ceiving. Alternatively, it is possible that the influence of language
only occurs at retrieval, with remembered distances migrating in
the direction of the remembered demonstrative/possessive. In
order to test between these alternatives, it is possible to run neu-
roimaging studies to measure the degree of peripersonal space
activation while viewing objects under different object knowledge
and/or language conditions (see Coventry et al., 2014 for discus-
sion). A second way one can get at this issue relates to memory
decay: if the influence of language operates at retrieval, then the
longer the time interval the greater the effects of language there
should be. We are currently exploring these possibilities.In summary, we found a main effect of language (demonstra-
tives and possessives) on memory for object location across exper-
iments. We teased apart the predictions of three different models
explaining this mechanism: the Expectation model, the
Congruence model, and the Attention allocation model. Overall,
results favored the Expectation model, suggesting that the
expected location of an object – cued by language (e.g., this for ref-
erents close by; that for referents further away) – and the actual
location are combined, leading to (mis)memory for object location.
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